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Equal Healthcare Act
Executive Summary
The US healthcare insurance market is in desperate need of reform. Currently, Americans face an
insurance crisis as premiums skyrocket while private providers agglomerate into fewer private
insurers. However, publicly run healthcare insurances are not excelling either. Government-run
insurance schemes, such as Medicare and Medicaid, are rapidly becoming burdened with citizens
either reaching retirement age or becoming unable to afford medical insurance. Current
government spending for healthcare has eclipsed $1 trillion dollars a year but does not begin to
cover all of the citizenry’s medical needs. Therefore, systematic change is needed to address both
the oligopolistic private market and the massive cost overruns for government-run healthcare.
When reforming the US healthcare system, the primary evaluative measures included
within this paper are (1) fiscal sustainability, (2) equal access to healthcare, (3) addressing
government failures, (4) addressing market failures, and (5) political feasibility. While many
reform bills have been evaluated to address these concerns, many fail to satisfy all five of these
requirements. Firstly, the bill must ensure the insurance schemes remain financially viable both
upon immediate passage and well into the future. Secondly, any bill that does not address the
unequal access to healthcare is unlikely to garner much support as most champions of reform are
primarily concerned with increasing the citizenry’s access to healthcare. Next, the bill must
address both the inherent structural problems within both government and private markets.
Government-run programs tend towards lethargic reactions to market conditions and fiscally
unsustainable bloat, while private programs are susceptible to the profit motives and self-serving
tendencies of private insurance at the expense of enrollees. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly,
any reform bill will need bipartisan support to make it through the House, Senate, and finally
past the Presidential Veto. The current inefficient system is best rectified by weaving a complex
and systematic alteration of the current healthcare insurance programs that takes all five of these
measures into account.
The alternative to the current system presented in this paper is the Equal Healthcare Act
(EHA). The EHA creates universal healthcare vouchers that peg their endowment solely to FICA
taxes, the taxes currently financing Medicare and Medicaid, for all citizens rather than just the
elderly and the poor. These vouchers can be spent on private, nonprofit insurance with the excess
held in a healthcare saving account to accrue interest over time. Compared to other reforms to
the current healthcare market, the Equal Healthcare Act addresses both the massive cost overruns
of the state and the significant proportion of the citizenry who cannot currently afford insurance.
Additionally, it reforms the government and private market insurance schemes to realign
incentives to serve the enrollees first. However, and perhaps most importantly, the EHA is the
only proposal that assuages the concerns of both the political left and right, respectively, as the
bill adjusts the private insurance market to serve the enrollee first while controlling government
deficit spending on fiscally unsustainable programs.
Introduction to US Healthcare
Before evaluating the current state of US healthcare, an analysis of the earliest formations of US
insurance programs will need to be introduced. Initially, itinerant religious practitioners, barbersurgeons, or town doctors provided care to people sometimes in exchange for bartered goods

such as food, precious metals, and occasionally for free if the sick could not pay. Often these
early medical professionals had essential religious duties, and many of these healers would be
sought out for their medical and religious expertise. As the medical profession became informed
of empirical science and modern medical practices, the ability of these doctors to heal, as well as
the complexity of the treatment, began to increase. As the 20th century dawned, medicine had
become firmly entrenched in empirical testing, and medical marvels such as insulin and
penicillin revolutionized the profession. However, the evolution in complexity and the
subsequent rising expense of treatments demanded an evolution in payment. No longer would
bartered bread or altruism be sufficient to pay for cutting-edge medical treatment. Therefore, the
costs of modern medicine incentivized groups to come together to assuage the crippling financial
burden an individual may face due to receiving modern medical care. Some nations, like the UK
and France, nationalized their medical industry making doctors part of the bureaucracy while
other nations, such as the US, left the costs and payment of medical treatment to be solved by
smaller groups.
In the US, most of these smaller groups created insurance pools. These pools, either
organized under a private company or as a nonprofit, would have enrollees pay a small premium
into the pool for safekeeping and investment to be paid out when someone in the pool requires
medical attention. Therefore, the risk to a single individual was minimized and prevented an
enrollee or their family from becoming destitute due to medical debts. Often, these first pools
were organized under large corporations pressured by labor unions for more substantial benefits.
However, those who did not receive health insurance through a provider were left to join an
insurance pool privately. These private pools were not cheap, and often the poor and elderly
could not afford the premiums for coverage. Therefore, the federal government created public
insurance pools called Medicare and Medicaid for the elderly and poor, respectively. These
programs have provided healthcare to millions of at-risk Americans at the cost of billions of
taxpayer dollars, though it still does not cover all citizens without private insurance. Some
analysts, like Jackson Hammond and Gordon Gray at the American Action Forum, have
projected that the Medicare insurance pool could become bankrupt by 2026 due to overly
generous policies and insufficient revenues.1
Policy Problem: The Issues of Insurance
Since the backdrop of US healthcare has been introduced, the policy problems endemic to the
private market will be evaluated to ascertain why the federal government felt compelled to
address these failures. Additionally, this paper will analyze the governmental failure in providing
health insurance as it has neither covered all who need it nor controlled costs to make the venture
fiscally sustainable. First, however, some basic definitions need to be clarified. Market failure
may be defined as when the basic assumptions of production and consumption create an
inefficiency or unforeseen externalities. According to a theoretical understanding of the US’s
competitive economic structure, this should not occur when driven by private choice and
informed by price signals. However, we will ascertain why there are glaring market failures
1
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specifically for insurance schemes. Broadly speaking, market failure occurs when a market
creates externalities, is endowed with informational asymmetries, or when the market is
distributing a non-private good. In this paper, private US healthcare is identified as having a
market failure because of all of these factors. The first factor is the contradictory nature of being
a private good forced into being a common good. The second factor describes the externalities of
private and public insurance plans with an acknowledgment of some minor asymmetrical
information issues.
When considering these two factors, further definitions need to be explored. What exactly
is a common good compared to a private good, and why is healthcare commonly considered to
be the former? Common goods are defined as goods or services whose nature is rivalrous yet
unexcludable. A rivalrous good means that the “consumption or use of the good or service
prevents another from consuming or using the good or service.”2 For example, when one patient
occupies a good such as a hospital bed, another patient cannot use the bed. When a patient
receives a service like surgery, the same surgeon cannot be giving surgery to another patient.
Because both resources and manpower are finite, the ability of medical services to provide for
patients is constrained. An excludable service is defined as one entity having “control over the
consumption or use of the good or service.”3 Restated, the provider of a good or service can
exclude those who do not pay for it. Before federal law prohibited denying service, doctors and
hospitals could deny treatment if the individual could not pay for treatment. However, after the
passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, hospitals cannot deny medical
service to anyone in an emergency situation. This act prevents healthcare from being a perfectly
excludable service. Therefore, healthcare can no longer be considered a purely private good,
rivalrous and excludable, or a purely public good, non-rivalrous and nonexcludable because it
has aspects of both.
Therefore, healthcare is now considered a common good, rivalrous but nonexcludable,
rather than a private or public good. Other examples of common goods include public parks and
public libraries. Someone else’s use of a campsite or book may conflict with one’s own, but one
cannot stop their use or deny them access to a campsite or book that one isn’t currently using.
However, in the case of healthcare, this nonexcludable aspect only applies to emergency use
which is also the most expensive. Chronic conditions like lifelong heart disease or multiple
sclerosis, however, are ineffectively managed if only acute symptoms are dealt with. With heart
disease, restarting the cardiac muscles after a heart attack and putting stints in to restore blood
flow only treats the immediate symptoms. Long-term healthcare, including regular checkups and
prescription medication, is required to mitigate and treat the patient’s contributing factors to
affordably deal with these medical issues.
Now that healthcare is defined as a common good, rivalrous and nonexcludable, the
second factor can be explored. What are the externalities of private and public plans, and what
asymmetrical information issues need to be explored? To explain, a deep dive into the origins of
public plans is required. The passage of the Social Security Amendments Act of 1965, popularly
known as the Medicare Bill, established the insurance programs of Medicare and Medicaid for
the elderly and poor, respectively. As mentioned previously, the programs were created to
2
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supplement the private insurance market that developed around the common good of healthcare.
While private healthcare insurers have an incentive to underserve insurees to maximize profit, a
perfect example of a negative externality, government run insurance pools also come with their
own externalities as well.
These externalities include Moral Hazard, Asymmetrical Information which occurs
regardless of who insures the patient, and finally the immense cost overruns of financing the
programs. Moral Hazard is defined as “the reduced incentive that insures have to prevent
compensable losses.”4 Essentially, those who receive insurance are not paying for the full cost
of the care they receive and are, therefore, unlikely to make proper financial decisions. As stated
earlier for most market conditions, private choice and price signals usually govern decision;
however, these signals are distorted by those who use insurance that are insulated from the cost
of their choices. For example, rather than pursuing treatment for a minor affliction, say a bad
cough, the insuree will go without care as medical treatment may be inconvenient in the moment.
In the case of worsening symptoms, such as a bad cough actually being a case of pneumonia,
then the insuree can receive treatment at little cost. The insurer, the company paying for the
treatment, would have preferred an insuree receive care back when the treatment was cheap and
preventable rather than the expensive and arduous process of curing pneumonia that may lead to
sepsis. A reverse symptom of moral hazard may also occur in which an insuree may go to an
emergency room regularly for minor afflictions that could be better served at an urgent care or an
over-the-counter medication at a pharmacy. Because insurees are insured from the higher cost of
the emergency room visit, insurees will not pursue the more cost effective option.
Therefore, when the insuree uses prevention healthcare too little or emergency healthcare
too much, Moral Hazard occurs. While Moral Hazard occurs in all insurance programs, it is
mitigated by sensible co-pays, fees, and deductibles that do charge an insuree some amount for
using healthcare but do not charge enough to again cause Moral Hazard via the insuree avoiding
care because of upfront costs. Typically, private healthcare charges higher co-pays, fees, and
deductibles to discourage overuse of emergency healthcare while Medicare uses lower co-pays,
fees, and deductibles to encourage prevention healthcare. Both come with their own Moral
Hazard problems in that private insurers may end up paying more when an ailment turns into a
major illness while Medicare cannot cover their costs with their generous policy. However,
Medicaid has the greatest problem with Moral Hazard because the poor are not charged anything
for their care. In addition to this complete free ride, Medicaid recipients also have an incentive
not to pursue better paying jobs because they may lose this free riding coverage due to an
increase in household income.
Insurance also creates an asymmetrical information problem because, in various ways,
either party will know more about a given subject. For insurers, they have an intimate knowledge
of both the insurance market and the healthcare market. Through their sheer economies of scale
of servicing so many people, they can largely eliminate the adverse selection of servicing costly
insurees by bargaining with hospitals for better rates than individuals could alone. Through this
monopsony power, disproportionate power given to a dominant purchaser of healthcare for a
given area, they will regularly create most-favored nation clauses with hospital groups which
specify a lower cost for the particular insurance company subsidized at the cost of other insurers.
While this may sound great to a person receiving this specific insurance, insurers will not always
4
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pass these cost savings on to consumers because the insurance market has largely agglomerated
into a few regional monopolies. Therefore, insurers can largely set their own prices without
having to compete. On the client side, the insuree knows more about their health than an
insurance agency. They may know about certain conditions that may run in their family and
choose not to disclose this information to avoid higher insurance rates. Insurers try to mitigate
this risk through medical examinations; however, these examinations are expensive and some
insurees may not have a history of medical visits to analyze. A final negative externality,
primarily but not exclusively found in government run care, is the rapidly inflating cost of these
policies. When first designed, the programs were financed based on a payroll tax. This tax is paid
partly by workers and partly by employers. Therefore, it is a tax on labor thus making the
employment of workers more expensive. While arguments about the implications between
tradeoffs of labor and automation are fascinating, they are sadly beyond the scope of this paper.
However, the massive cost overruns of Medicare and Medicaid are a large impetus for healthcare
reform.
In summary, the private health insurance market cannot effectively be a private good
because of federal law. Therefore, it is forced to be a common good. Because common goods are
unable to exclude those who cannot pay, Medicare and Medicaid were created. However,
Medicare and Medicaid are unable to reconcile their generous programs with their finite
resources. Thereby, a fiscal crisis is looming that threatens both programs’ solvency and possibly
the federal government as a whole. Moreover, the US federal government has proven unable, or
at least unwilling, to achieve the goal of providing healthcare to all who cannot afford it within
reasonable constraints. Furthermore, politicians seem loathe to address the core issues of the
programs. Conversely, private health insurers have begun to agglomerate power becoming, at
best, monopsonies where their market share allows significant control over health insurance in a
given region or state, or, at worst, a statewide monopoly within a larger apparatus of oligopolies
that prevent new entrants from entering the market. Therefore, the greatest obstacle to providing
citizens with affordable healthcare is the inefficient and expensive insurance pools diseased with
market and government failures. Only a circumspect reform to the apparatus as a whole can
solve the endemic issues to the current insurance apparatuses.
Regulatory Environment: Market and Government Failure
Market Failure:
As previously mentioned in the Introduction and Policy Problem sections, the US has debated
the role of the federal government in controlling the healthcare industry for almost a century, yet
the existence of private insurance markets was not always assured. A large minority of the US
population did not have access to healthcare insurance even by the mid-1900s. This underserved
minority were typically members of one or more groups with the largest groups being the poor
and elderly. Poor workers usually worked without healthcare benefits despite being employed.
They could either not afford an individual plan or could not find access in their area. The elderly,
typically not working and living off of a fixed income from pensions, struggled to afford
insurance because they were considered an at-risk group due to their advanced age. Some
western countries created single-payer insurance programs where everyone is largely treated
equally, and priority is based on apparent need. The US, instead, took a market approach that
created different tiers of care for different costs with the exception of emergency need. Some

citizens could afford excellent healthcare while other citizens used healthcare sparingly
according to income and need. Citizens and unions proceeded to lobby legislatures to deal with
the negative externalities the market based healthcare system created. Namely, they cited issues
such as insufficient coverage in certain geographic areas, the high premiums for those least able
to pay, and the disastrous effect a medical emergency for a primary household earner can have
on a family. These arguments then led Congress to conclude that the free market was ineffective
for the reasons cited above and to enact legislation to address the negative externalities of the
free market healthcare system financed by a payroll tax.
Despite the drawbacks of the payroll tax, namely its tax upon labor making labor
proportionally more expensive than capital, the overall machinations of the program involved all
workers paying this tax to finance the initial Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. Furthermore, the
new employment of workers could offset the poor who qualify for Medicaid and the next round
of elderly insurees. However, the rapid retirement of the Baby Boomer generation, those that
have been paying into the program their entire lives and expect their due entitlement, has created
a looming demand shock that may permanently disrupt the program. Therefore, it is in the
interest of citizens to not only ensure that healthcare is being provided in an efficient manner but
also to mitigate the costs to taxpayers. But how high are Medicare and Medicaid costs, and why
are they a problem?
As stated above, the federal government funds these programs through a payroll tax
called the Federal Insurance Contributions Act tax (FICA tax).5 This payroll tax takes 6.2% of an
individual’s income, before paying federal and state income taxes, as well as another 6.2% from
their employer to fund various programs including Social Security. The contributions from
within this payroll tax for Medicare and Medicaid amount to 1.45% for both the worker and
employer for a total of 2.9%. However, the self-employed pay both portions of this tax as they
are both the worker and the owner. Regarding the structure of these programs, Medicare is run
by the federal government while Medicaid is run by the states who receive block grants from the
federal government with some guidelines on how it must be spent. The Affordable Care Act
raised some Medicaid benefits but not all states have adopted them. But how many people does
each policy insure, and what is the cost to taxpayers? In 2018, Medicare covered roughly 60
million Americans6 at a cost of $740 billion or approximately $12,300 per person.7 In 2017
Medicaid covered an additional 74 million Americans8 at approximately $605 billion, $375
billion paid by the federal government and $230 billion paid by the state governments.9
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Medicaid, therefore, costs federal government around $5000 per person and costs the state
government around $3100 per person. While Medicare does have charges including premiums,
co-pays, and deductibles to mitigate some costs, the total costs for Medicare and Medicaid seem
immense. Combined with Social Security and the other portion of the FICA tax, the federal
government in 2019 spent over $2 trillion in outlays while only receiving $1.2 trillion from the
full FICA tax.
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not have healthcare even with these massive resources being dedicated.11 While providing
medical insurance to the elderly and poor may not be the sole driver of these cost overruns, they
are the largest contributing factor and will need reform to remain solvent. However, the cost
overruns and future insolvency is but one externality or unforeseen consequence with providing
government funded healthcare. As sated above, the externalities of Moral Hazard and
Asymmetrical Information also need to be addressed.
Government Failure:
Politicians are always searching for another cause to champion; in essence, that is what they are
elected and sworn to do. From a cynical viewpoint, politicians will be self-serving as their
service is largely to sate personal goals, namely retaining office, rather than serving the
collective people within the nation. Initially, perhaps some politicians’ intentions were honest
about helping the elderly and poor. However, the bloated apparatuses of Medicare and Medicaid
have been causing fiscal crises for decades as Republicans and Democrats seem unwilling to
fully reform the policies. On one hand Democrats, the initial creators of the programs, have
sought to expand the federal government’s role in healthcare by creating single-payer systems
ostensibly under pretenses of reducing costs to citizens. Cynically speaking, Democrats want
universal healthcare to show that they care about the citizenry to reap the political rewards from
any good externalities. However, they can deflect to the bureaucracy of Medicare or Medicaid
for any negative externalities. Conversely, Republicans are loathe to give more power to the
federal government as it has proven unable to balance FICA taxes and the budget as a whole.
Cynically speaking, they want to show they care about taxpayers, yet they can deflect to a
particular insurer’s ineffectiveness regarding the abundant negative externalities within the
private market.
In 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) tried to bridge the gap between both parties by
implementing some cost reduction measures with an expanded coverage of the uninsured.
Additionally, it mandated that all citizens get either public or private insurance or face
substantial fines. However, some Democrats argued that it did not go far enough as private
insurers still existed to benefit from their risk pools while Republicans argued that certain
portions of the ACA were unconstitutional and that it was fiscally irresponsible. While both
groups’ arguments have merits, Democrats were unable to convince the public that they can
execute a more substantial plan than the ACA with the mandate being rolled back while
Republicans have been unable to fully pass legislation since Medicare Part D Plans under Bush
in 2003. While Republicans passed the American Health Care Plan (AHCA) in the House under
President Trump and Congressman Paul Ryan, it failed to pass the Senate. The main points of the
AHCA were an emphasis on healthcare savings accounts, price competition, cost transparency,
and a reduced federal cost for programs; however, this proved insufficient to both sides of the
isle with former Republican presidential candidate John McCain blocking the bill in the senate.
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Policy Goals
Because the government has proven itself incapable of financing its own obligations and the
private market has an inherent motive to profit at the expense of insurees or hospitals, the
solution to this market and governmental failure must be sweeping and circumspect. Its goal
should be to provide the citizenry access to healthcare, regardless of financial status, within
budget constraints. To do this, it will need to sweepingly change the frameworks of Medicare
and Medicaid as well as mitigate the externalities of an unregulated free market. However, the
solution must also be politically feasible to reach fruition. Compromises must, therefore, be
engineered to satiate both sides of the aisle.
Fiscal Sustainability
The first measure of any policy must be its fiscal sustainability. If the program bankrupts the
state, the policy cannot continue. Therefore, this measure forecasts the ability of the state or
private market to fund and sustain whatever outlays it entitles citizens or insurance programs.
Equal Access
The second measure of the policies must measure how it plans on distributing the common good
of healthcare. Debates have lasted decades as to the extent of who should be covered under these
programs. However, the trend has always sought to include more of the citizenry under coverage
rather than less. While unequivocal equal access may not necessarily be needed for passage, it is
an important aspect to consider especially to those on the left side of the aisle.
Addressing Government Failures
The third measure of any policy is how it addresses the government failures of Moral Hazard and
of inefficient outcomes, namely a benefiting of one group over another. As stated earlier, moral
hazard is the benefit from healthcare without having to pay for it which can create perverse
incentives like waiting to use healthcare until a condition worsens or using healthcare too
frequently. Inefficient outcomes like creating perverse incentives that benefit the elderly or poor
can also have unintended consequences. Those about to retire may hold off expensive healthcare
until they qualify for Medicare that way taxpayers pay for it rather than themselves. The poor
may also have a perverse incentive to remain poor as higher paying jobs may not necessarily
come with healthcare coverage, making them actually worse off.
Addressing Market Failures
The fourth measure is how a bill addresses the systematic perversion of profit in insurance pools.
While profit is normally a good incentive to encourage innovation, competition, and reducing
prices, insurance pools do not operate on these principles. Because they benefit from massive
economies of scales, at best these pools become monopolistic competitors with regional
monopolies or become a part of an expansive oligopoly of insurers who are price makers not
price takers. They are simply a pool system and cannot devise strategies for increasing profit
without making enrollees worse off beyond increasing economies of scale. Furthermore, the

asymmetrical information they have given their intensive knowledge of the market give them an
advantageous position when negotiating premium rates and other mechanisms such as co-pays
and deductibles.
Political Feasibility
Finally, political feasibility gauges the probability of the policy to become an enacted reform.
While some ideas may make sense on paper, they are not useful if they fail to convince the
public or elicit support from congressional representatives and senators. While some bills may
inspire future bills to adopt certain policies, this paper will focus on how the bill would pass the
contemporary political atmosphere.
Policy Alternatives
Current Policy
The current policy of the US healthcare system has already been explained at length under the
Introduction and Regulatory Environment. To restate, the current system is based on the use of
insurance pools. Private pools run by corporations and public pools run by Medicare and
Medicaid provide payment to hospitals and doctors’ offices in the event of care. However, some
uninsured citizens either pay massively out of pocket or do not pay at all, which passes the cost
to the hospital which passes the costs on again to other patients. The US’s current policy largely
follows the rules stated under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but the provision for mandatory
coverage has since been repealed.
Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act is the largest healthcare reform act passed since Medicare Part D
coverage under President George W. Bush. It drastically increased premiums for many citizens
but increased the amount of insured citizens. Essentially, the ACA insured the most expensive
citizens which forced others to subsidize their treatment. Many Americans found this to be
distasteful and argued against the legality the individual mandate, forcing Americans to pay for
health insurance under penalty of fines. Overall, the ACA failed to provide healthcare to all but
managed to reduce uninsured by half while increasing the federal deficit by over $300 billion
dollars.12
American Health Care Act
The AHCA was created to replace and reform the ACA; however, it did not pass through the
Senate. Its main goal of repealing the individual mandate was achieved as it was passed under a

12

David Blumenthal, Sara R Collins, and Elizabeth Fowler, “The Affordable Care Act at 10 Years: What's the Effect
on Health Care Coverage and Access?,” ACA at 10 Years: What's the Effect on Coverage and Access? |
Commonwealth Fund, February 26, 2020, https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/journalarticle/2020/feb/aca-at-10-years-effect-health-care-coverage-access.

bill unrelated to healthcare reform. Some ideas, such as the creation of Healthcare Savings
Accounts, have seen widespread private adoption since its media coverage.
Medicare for All
Medicare for All seeks to expand the current Medicare system to all citizens which includes
absorbing those currently under Medicaid. Other countries have similar systems where the
government acts as sole or primary insurer of citizens for healthcare, but the system has proven
distasteful to many in America and has been branded as socialism. Arguments over whether
universal healthcare insurance is socialism, democratic socialism, or simply a generous welfare
state aside, the program has been explored for decades but has never passed the House or Senate.
Therefore, comparisons to this hypothetical plan are generalization and not specific.
Equal Healthcare Act
While constructing this paper, the initial aim was simply to reform Medicare and Medicaid using
Universal Healthcare Vouchers. However, that single piecemeal change would not substantially
change the inherent flaws in the healthcare market. Insurers would continue to be predatory and
seek to use their clients rather than serve them. The government programs would fail to cover all
citizens while being fiscally irresponsible and potentially undermining the stability of the entire
federal government. The problems were many and the solutions few. Therefore, a comprehensive
policy just as complex as the problem had to be created. Not only that, but the demands of
liberals and conservatives had to be balanced. Neither could be given dominance over the other
or else the solution would turn partisan. This system of healthcare had to be made unique and
tailored to America’s core values. State run hospitals and single payer coverage are anathema to
Americans who value freedom of choice; therefore, a market mechanism had to be employed to
guarantee widespread support. Additionally, privatizing Medicare and Medicaid without
ensuring quality of care is also anathema to aging Americans who have paid into the system their
entire lives. Hopefully, this paper or some of its ideas will one day be used as a basis for true
healthcare reform to bring equal healthcare opportunities to all citizens.
Assessment of Alternatives
As this paper primarily serves to illustrate the benefits of the EHA, the analysis of policy
alternatives will be kept brief.
Current Policy
Fiscal Sustainability
As stated earlier, the current policies of Medicare and Medicaid are draining the state of funds
and may lead to insufficient funds by the end of the decade. While the private market is infinitely
sustainable, the market may adjust by dropping less healthy individuals as they are not profitable
to retain. If the public programs are not maintained, it is unlikely that private market insurances
will be likely to enroll the most at risk groups at an affordable rate.

Equal Access
Currently, 90% of the market is covered, but the likelihood of the market retaining the current
percentage depends upon whether Medicare and Medicaid will stay fiscally sustainable.13 If not,
the equal access to healthcare for all citizens when they retire may not be a part of the future
American Dream.
Addressing Government Failures
The current policies of Medicare and Medicaid still have issues with moral hazard and inefficient
outcomes. Enrollees are likely to overuse resources without having to pay for the costs.
Addressing Market Failures
The current market for private insurance uses its advantages in economies of scale and
asymmetric information to extract wealth from enrollees while enriching themselves. The private
venture into health insurance for monetary gain has necessitated reform into a more competitive
system.
Political Feasibility
Sadly, the current policy is the most likely to continue as the lethargy of the legislature and
bureaucracy hinders sweeping reform until a crisis looms. Additionally, the rampant debate over
the ACA and method of its passage and provisional repeal has left many citizens tired and
apathetic to the current situation as high premiums and deductibles have been tolerated for so
long.
Affordable Care Act
Fiscal Sustainability
The ACA cost roughly $300 billion and increased federal deficit spending. While not at large as
other spending bills such as Medicare for All, the increased costs associated with putting more
citizens on Medicaid, the insurance program with the greatest amount of overuse and fewest cost
preventions mechanisms, have proven unsustainable when combined with other spending
programs.
Equal Access
The ACA sought to increase access for the uninsured and dropped the uninsured rate from 20%
to 10% of the population. However as displayed below, the ACA has reduced the number of
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private providers turning many counties in monopolies or oligopolies because compliance has
made the market unprofitable or too difficult to administer without agglomeration.

14

Addressing Government Failures
The ACA does not address government failures and instead exacerbated the issue with overuse in
the Medicaid program by expanding its funding to several states.
Addressing Market Failures
The ACA also helped consumers make more informed decisions by categorizing private plans
into four tiers based on expected healthcare payments are Bronze for 60%, Silver for 70%, Gold
for 80%, and Platinum for 90%.15 The ACA also restricted the amount that insurance providers
can charge older enrollees. In fact, a community rating is created based off regional costs that
prohibit the elderly from being charged more than 3 times what the youngest enrollees are
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charged to help mitigate the elderly’s costs at the expense of the young.16 Additionally, the ACA
banned insurance providers from dropping enrollees from their plan while they are ill. 17
Political Feasibility
Considering that the ACA was passed into law, the ideas behind the bill are politically feasible.
However, the individual and employer mandates were removed in 2017. Many ideas in the
program were widely supported including allowing children to stay on family plans until age 26,
providing simple categories for plans to be placed under, and some states supported the
expansion of Medicaid. However, simmering dislike of the bill has stopped legislative reform on
the issue of both private and government insurance pools for the past decade.
American Health Care Act
Fiscal Sustainability
The AHCA was projected to lower the deficit by $350 billion over a decade as $1.2 trillion
would not have been paid out while simultaneously collecting $900 billion less in taxes.18 The
AHCA would, therefore, be fiscally sustainable in the long run.
Equal Access
The AHCA was likely to increase the percentage of citizens without coverage from 10% to 20%
or higher. However, this figure is an estimate as the bill was not passed.
Addressing Government Failures
The AHCA did not address the issue of Moral Hazard or inefficiencies in the government
systems. Perhaps an amendment on such systems could have happened under reconciliation, but
no formal amendment was passed with the bill.
Addressing Market Failures
The AHCA did not address the market failures of profit motive and, instead, incentivized private
insurers to drop those it added under the ACA.
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Political Feasibility
Considering that the largest version bill failed, and the removal of the mandates only passed
because a skinny version was attached to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the political
feasibility of this bill is low. Even members in the Republican Party who wrote the bill felt that
the bill was not bipartisan enough and did not address the issues regarding private profit motive
or insurance pool structure.
Medicare for All
Fiscal Sustainability
Estimates of the financial cost of Medicare for All are largely inconsistent with some claiming
that it would costs less than Medicare does now and others claiming that it would cost trillions.
While no formal act has passed either the House or Senate, the plan would likely cost trillions
and massively increase deficit spending, at least in the short term unless a comprehensive tax
reform, likely regarding payroll tax rates, was also passed concurrently.
Equal Access
Medicare for all provides a government-sponsored insurance option that can largely outcompete
private insurance as profits will not be needed to run the program. Therefore, it is likely that all
citizens will enroll in the program for its benefits at the expense of taxpayers. Additionally,
taxpayers will likely join the program as arguments against joining are mitigated as free riders
will already be using the program. Likely, most citizens will enroll while some citizens who
receive sufficient insurance through their employers will stay on their current plans if they are
sustainable. Company plans will, however, likely be phased out as the government will provide
the service at no charge to the company beyond payroll taxes already paid.
Addressing Government Failures
Medicare for all does not solve the issues of moral hazard but does solve the issues of inefficient
outcomes. While users are more likely to overuse healthcare than underuse, the access of all
citizens to the pool negates the concerns of benefitting the elderly and poor at the expense of
others as all citizens are eligible.
Addressing Market Failures
Medicare for All address market failures in that it is likely to push most private insurers out of
the market. Perhaps some will still exist given that some large employers have generous
healthcare already sustained by significant endowments. But the majority of insurers, even with a
profit motive, will find it difficult to retain enrollees given that Medicare for All does not have to
be profitable.

Political Feasibility
As even those on the Democratic side of the aisle think this program is not feasible due to fiscal
insufficiency, Medicare is unlikely to be expanded to all citizens. The Republican Party and their
supporters expect that individual citizens should have the right to choose who their insurance
providers are and that the profit motive to improve and make money prevents catastrophically
generous plans.
Equal Healthcare Act
This paper recommends the creation of an Equal Healthcare Act (EHA) that borrows elements
from Germany’s sickness funds or nonprofit insurance model (NPIs) and Australia’s
superannuation system. Additionally, it uses provisions from the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
regarding the individual mandate while also taking provisions from the American Health Care
Act (AHCA) regarding national price competition, cost transparency, and Health Savings
Accounts (HSAs). Furthermore, the EHA synthesizes these ideas with the author’s take on FICA
tax disbursement, Universal Healthcare Vouchers (UHVs), Federal Reserve financing, financial
reporting, administrative cost caps, expanding family plans, banning most-favored-nation
clauses, eliminating out-of-network fees, and reallocating Medicare and Medicaid enrollees.
As the private market was the cause of the initial market failure with its inability to cover
all citizens sustainably, a private solution is unlikely especially given the federal government’s
authority over the market. Therefore, a state solution is needed to cover the existing market
failure of insufficient coverage combined with unsustainable cost outlays. However, why would
one call for a state solution to a problem that the state has proven itself incapable or unwilling to
solve? Simply put, the state is the only one with the power to do so. It must realign incentives
and disincentives in the private market to mandate coverage while excusing the government from
running programs like Medicare and Medicaid.
Fiscal Sustainability
The first provision starts with the redistribution of FICA taxes. Instead of FICA taxes being a
supplementary component to Medicare and Medicaid, it is now the sole generator of funds in the
form of Universal Healthcare Vouchers. Rather than the arguably ageist and classist Medicare
and Medicaid, these UHVs are provided to all citizens in equal amounts. If all of FICA taxes
from 2019 were equally redistributed to all citizens, each citizen would have $3500 for outlays,
assuming a 3.22% administration cost which is on par with the administration costs of Medicare
and Medicaid. These UHVs must then be either spent on NPIs or accumulated in Health Savings
Accounts. These HSAs are tax deductible accounts that also allow citizens to deposit money for
future healthcare outlays. Employers can also fund HSAs or match contributions. However,
companies regardless of size are under no mandate to contribute thereby decoupling employment
from health insurance. However, a matching increase in salary or a reallotment to the HSAs will
be mandated during the shift.
The sublime beauty of UHVs deposited into HSAs is that they will constantly accrue over
the lifetime of the citizen. From a citizen’s birth, this account will be stocked year after year with
FICA tax money and can only be withdrawn by a legal guardian before reaching adulthood to
pay for insurance or deductibles. While the citizen is young and healthy, the HSA can accrue

interest which provides for future medical needs. Since these healthy, young citizens are all
required to be enrolled in insurance pools subsidized by their UHVs, premiums for the elderly
and sick will be lowered. Broadly speaking, the average family of four spends approximately
$11000 on healthcare premiums every year19, but the UHVs will cover all of this with a surplus
left over assuming that premiums remain constant. Even if no employer added to the HSAs,
parents would only be responsible for deductibles which largely negates issues regarding the
ACA forcing every household to purchase insurance. Additionally, while the UHV portion of the
HSA will only grow at the rate of federal bonds, all other deposits into the HSA account can be
invested as seen fit. Because the Federal Reserve will be supporting this payout through the sale
of federal bonds, the UHVs will be matched to the bonds’ payouts. The Federal Reserve will be
responsible for providing the initial disbursement of UHVs because this plan also provides back
pay to all citizens since their birth minus accumulated expenses.
However, if any individual’s accumulated expenses overtake FICA backpay, the resulting
cost overruns are simply absorbed by the Federal Reserve costing nothing for the citizen out of
pocket. Given the large amount of currency reserves that will need to be created to finance this
initial wave, it is preferrable for the Federal Reserve to hold on to the reserves and slowly doll it
out for medical expenses to prevent inflation shocks. A further externality that may occur is that
citizens may encourage an increase in the federal bond percent yields thereby increasing UHVs’
returns. This may have a counter balancing effect on the current insistence by Congress that
yields remain low to finance their fiscally irresponsible deficit spending. However, studying this
possible externality in detail is beyond the scope of this current paper.
Equal Access
As the current market failure is deeply intertwined with government-run health programs which
account for 40% of the healthcare,20 the failure lies in both structuring of the private insurance
apparatus as well as the government apparatus. However, while private insurers which account
for roughly 50% of the market are not without their own externalities, the primary market failure
resides with the government programs as the final 10% of the market, 27 million citizens, are
still without insurance. However, the current policies lack in effective implementation and
sustainability in that they cannot support their current outlays.
Addressing Government Failures
The EHA addresses the two most significant government failures, Moral Hazard and inefficient
outcomes, by forcing all citizens to purchase health insurance. Since UHVs pay a sizable portion
of premiums, the moral hazard of not receiving preventive care is largely negated. The moral
hazard of overusing care is also negated as citizens will still need to pay deductibles and co pays.
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If they claim an inability to cover these costs, the government can seize future UHVs to pay for
the service and be allowed to access IRS files to check whether this is true or whether they are
simply trying to free ride the system. A small, special fund run by Health and Human Services
could be created to deal with the most extreme cases such as an orphan child needing expensive
surgery with no family HSA savings and a depleted UHV subaccount.
Addressing Market Failures
The next provision regards the nature of insurance pools market. Currently, private insurance has
administration costs between 12-18% compared to around 2% for government insurance.21 While
the low percentage for government insurance programs can be partially accounted for by the
massive amount of disbursements, economies of scale greatly boost the effectiveness of
healthcare pools per administrator. Therefore, an agglomeration of the market would be
preferred; however, insurers are currently prevented from competing across state lines which
keeps their operations regional but small. The current reason being the insurers may misuse
monopsony power and most-favored nation clauses to enrich themselves or their stockholders at
the expense of care givers and the insurees. Therefore, private insurers will be mandated to
become non-profits insurances (NPIs). The normal profit incentive of insurers dictated that
employers, employees, and the hospitals themselves must be underserved to increase profit.
Premiums, co-pays, fees, and high deductibles are currently used improperly to extract wealth
from clients. By not incentivizing clients to use healthcare when ailments are easily preventable
and cost-efficient, for-profit insurers have pushed clients to only use healthcare in an extreme
case or to not purchase insurance at all. Instead, NPIs must be forced to use their profits to
increase their endowments thereby decreasing premiums. NPIs, therefore, will have proper
incentives to serve their clients rather than use their clients. No longer will insurance companies
squander funds by squandering money on stock buybacks or be used as simple a tool for
investment. Furthermore, NPIs will be required to submit all financial information just like
publicly traded companies under GAPP. However, NPIs still have an incentive to increase
administration costs in the form of bonuses and other perks. Therefore, the EHA will mandate
that no more than 15% of the costs of running the NPI can be used for administration with the
costs declining by 1% for each year since implementation until reaching 5%, a comparably
generous amount compared to government run insurance pools.
Inspired by Australia’s superannuation model, citizens will also be required to deposit
1% of their yearly income into their personal HSA. Households can split their 1% among
themselves and their children as they see fit. The 1% can simply be added to the HSA under the
federal reserve in which case it will become a federal reserve bond or be sent into the market as a
subaccount that can be invested at will. This requirement is to habituate citizens into saving for
future expenses without imposing a substantial burden on the citizenry. Inspired from the ACA,
some provisions include reintroducing the individual mandate and allowing those under age 26
to remain on family plans. The individual mandate was heavily criticized because it was a forced
fee or fine on all citizens who refused to purchase an expensive service. Now, this provision
should be tolerated because the state subsidizes the cost of healthcare for all. No longer will an
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individual be forced to pay a $2000 fine for not being able to afford a $3000 premium. Even if
the premiums increase to $4000, the estimated $3500 voucher pays for the majority of the cost.
The allowance for those under 26 to stay on family plans has also proven popular with the
public, and an expansion of allowing any family member of any age to stay on a healthcare plan
should be explored.
Inspired from the AHCA, the EHA endorse allowing NPIs to compete across state lines,
increasing maximum allowances for family HSA contribution, allowing families to deduct costs
of healthcare premiums from taxes, forcing hospitals into transparency by mandating price
comparisons, and waving core essential services from NPIs including controversial abortion
services and birth control. Republicans argued that not forcing insurances to compete across state
lines led to less competitive markets with a few monopsony powered insurances per state. Now,
monopsony power is less likely to occur, and even if it does, the profits from said power will be
added to endowments. Increasing HSA allowances for families allows for greater cushions
against medical losses and allows parents to receive a tax deduction for spending on their own
and their children’s healthcare. Because family plans and HSAs may now become generational,
children can then in turn care for the medical costs of parents as they age. Perhaps most
importantly, forcing hospitals to show prices brings the market closer to an ideal economic
market as the price axis of a hypothetical supply-demand model is no longer obscured. Because
prices are now mandated to be transparent, citizens can now shop around for elective medicine
and find the best deal which encourages hospitals to provide better services at lower prices.
Finally, mandated core essentials to healthcare are now removed, so families and individuals can
now customize their healthcare and remove extraneous features that may add to their expense or
violate their morals.
Other provisions include banning most-favored nation clauses for providers and
eliminating discrimination on in-network vs out-of-network expenses. Together, these two
provisions create a fair and competitive market where NPIs and insurees have clear costs that can
be more easily modeled and forecasted. Therefore, NPIs may arrange for elective medicine to
take place where the insuree wants it rather than being constrained to a single locale, provider, or
specialist. Lastly, all created NPIs will, according to endowment comparison and region, be
allocated current Medicare and Medicaid enrollees thereby creating a universal but free market.
This market controls for profit motive by mandating all insurances become NPIs and for costs by
pegging UHVs to FICA taxes. Former Medicare recipients will either choose to take the
backlogged UHV or have their current plan and premiums frozen with some adjustment for
inflation. Therefore, Medicare’s generous entitlements and plans can be unaltered but slowly
phased out over time. Other aspects of the EHA include UHVs providing an insightful metric to
citizens, political pundits, and researchers about the overall health of the economy i.e., wages
going up or more workers employed increases UHVs. Additionally, extended family plans for
insurance will allow NPIs to track genetic or environmental conditions All of these factors
together will create a more inclusive and more efficient healthcare marketplace.
Political Feasibility
While the author cannot speak with any definitive substance about the likelihood of passage,
some key factors need to be evaluated. Does this current plan restrict future government
spending and allow for the market to sustain itself indefinitely? Yes. Does this current plan cover
all citizens as Democrats tend to insist upon? Yes. Does this plan address the government

failures Republicans loathe such as moral hazard and benefitting one group at the expense of
others? Yes. Does this plan address the inherently uncompetitive insurance market and adjust
incentives to focus on benefiting enrollees rather than investor pocketbooks as Democrats want?
Yes. Will these combinations of factors ultimately lead to successful passage? No. The wind of
changes cannot be forced to blow in any direction. However, this bill gives the ship of state the
largest sail, the greatest leverage, to ride the winds of change.
Considering Tradeoffs and Consequences
As shown in Appendix A, the tradeoffs and consequences of not adopting the EHA are possibly
catastrophic. No other plan solves the five main issues as well, but timing is everything in
politics. According to the author, this may be the correct path; political realities may make the
change untenable, at least in the short term. When the consequences of keeping the current
policy begin to create political realities about the necessity of reform, the EHA should provide a
starting blueprint for reform. Perhaps some find the reform too much of a compromise, but
perhaps the ideas inspire a better plan on either side of the aisle and fix these systemic issues
before it is too late.
Recommendation
If a Representative or Senator was told that healthcare reform could be implemented in such a
way to keep market choice yet provide universal healthcare without implementing any new
taxes, a cursory glance at Appendix A should entice them enough for a conversation or deeper
read. Assuming that the client of this paper would be a Representative or a Senator concerned
about the rising discontent over the current healthcare systems in America, the rationale of this
paper is to provide an initial framework to workshop ideas and solutions that will hopefully be
optimized in the final edition of the bill.
Adoption
If the EHA in its current guise is sent to a subcommittee and then further on to the floor of the
House or Senate, there are likely to be changes. Any bill as complex as this is likely to have
detractors trying to insert poison pill amendments. Additionally, pork barrel spending may also
occur where unrelated issues and attached to this bill. The focus of the adoption section is not to
analyze the theoretical tertiary amendments but to understand and evaluate likely issues with the
bill as it stands.
Democrats are likely to take consternation with the locking payouts only to FICA taxes.
They may also insist upon a change in the payroll tax amount to increase funding as well as on
certain standards on health insurance quality to prevent droppage in effective coverage. Perhaps
they want to add core essentials to the plan that force insurers to provide access to birth control
or other services beyond emergency medical care. They will also insist that 1% is not enough to
mandate each citizen dedicate to healthcare, or perhaps insist that the federal government or state
government perform a matching program to that investment to encourage further savings. Some
legislators receiving donations from hospital group would not want their benefactors to be forced
to reveal prices both to cover their own campaign finances and give hospitals better negotiating

leverage Finally, Democrats may insist that those near retirement age, say age 55, should have
the option of Medicare coverage rather than private coverage.
Republicans are likely to take consternation with the newly developed class of nonprofit
insurers; they might also insist on stockholder retention or payoffs. Perhaps they will want the
idea of nonprofit insurers stricken from the EHA which would bring back the profit incentive at
the expense of both insurees and taxpayers. They might disagree that the government has the
right to mandate that all citizens purchase health insurance, even if UHVs subsidize that
purchase. Most likely, they also view that the 1% investment mandate into HSAs is also not a
right of the government to mandate, and Republicans receiving campaign contributions from
insurance companies will want the most-favored nation clauses to remain. Finally, their may be
some objection to the family-oriented insurance programs that help insurers analyze common
family conditions violate personal privacy, and these legislators will want an amendment to
insure that all medical data is private and erased if the citizen moves to another insurance pool.
All of these concerns and more should be evaluated when introducing the bill into
committee. Some concerns are genuine; some concerns are self-serving. However, UHVs and
HSAs being created and tied to FICA taxes are the core of the bill and must be implemented to
achieve the broad goals of insuring equal access to healthcare, eliminating government failures,
and restoring fiscally sustainable programs. Creating nonprofit insurance is also required to
address market failures and insure the citizen is the primary concern. Insurance being used to
generate wealth does not serve the citizens, only the citizens rich enough to invest.
Implementation
Firstly, a committee staffed by members from Health and Human Services and other executive
departments will calculate the total backlog of vouchers per citizen. This measure is simple as it
only requires FICA taxes per year divided by the citizen population at the time. Afterwards, each
year’s payout will be added according to the citizen’s age. It will then subtract any outflows
reported under Medicare and Medicaid to that specific citizen. The HSAs will then be stocked
with the appropriate level of funds, and in the case of negative funds meaning that the citizen has
receive more funding in Medicare and Medicaid than the inflow in backlogged vouchers, the
citizen will simply have a neutral balance of zero. Under the circumstance that the citizen needs
emergency funding for an ongoing chronic illness or catastrophic care, a commission will
evaluate the funding necessary and decide on the course of action.
To reform the private market insurance companies, a committee would be formed to set
about criteria for restructuring the firms. Stockholders will be reimbursed their stock prices
locked in at their value 1 year before passage but adjusted for inflation and general market
growth. The speed of the payouts will be determined by the corporations’ board of directors or
functional equivalent. Employees will continue to operate while taking on more enrollees as
former Medicare and Medicaid enrollees join. As Medicare enrollees retain the same benefits
and premiums as before the change, former Health and Human Services employees will educate
the private insurances on the details of the benefits which will hopefully open doors of
alternative employment and allow time for current workers to transition into other careers.
Administration costs will be reviewed by a special commission under the IRS that will provide a
framework for reevaluating labor force and capital costs to ensure a smooth transition and
compliance under GAAP.

With regards to the funding of Social Security now that the FICA tax subsumed the
entirety of the payroll tax, Congress will need to secure alternative funding through other taxes
which may prompt needed reform. To reform the government programs of Medicare and
Medicaid, current HHS employees responsible for outlays will be shifted to work under the
Federal Reserve in a subdepartment to ensure all citizen HSAs are properly accrued in
perpetuity. Additionally, this newly reorganized HHS labor force will have the option of
becoming liaisons with the new nonprofit insurers to adapt Medicare benefits to the private
programs. A severance package will also be included for those unable or unwilling to transition
that amounts to two years’ salary plus educational benefits. Furthermore, a new measure of
economic health will be available to the Bureau of Labor Statistics that keeps track of UHVs to
measure the economy’s overall health. If UHVs go up, more people are employed proportionally,
or their wages are increasing. If UHVs go down, less people are working proportionally, or their
wages are decreasing. What effect minimum wage laws, widespread immigration amnesty, or
any other economic policy will have will be objects of great interest if the EHA is passed.
Evaluation
The evaluation of the EHA is based on its effect on practical reality. Therefore, if the EHA does
become law and is enforced, a guideline for evaluation must be created. This evaluation needs to
consider factors such as: are the UHVs sufficient for most citizens’ coverage? How much do
premiums cost, and are they rising or falling? Are those currently on Medicare finding their
HSAs empty, or are there ample reserves? Are the new nonprofits thriving with the influx of new
insurees, or are they burdened by the administrative work or rising costs of coverage? Are the
endowments used in the nonprofits increasing or decreasing? Are the administrative costs
increasing or decreasing for nonprofits? Are the family healthcare plans popular, or are the
concerns over family privacy incentivizing individual plans? Have hospitals been complaining of
collection issues, or has the collection process been streamlined? Are prices for medical services
increasing or decreasing, and why? Can the process of transition be streamlined in any way? Are
businesses thriving or struggling under the new system? Are those with company insurance
happy or not? Is stability returning to the system? Are the citizens happy, or do they wish for
reform in some area? Should the reform happen now, later, or at all?
In a broader sense, the evaluation needs to consider the five initial measures. Is the
program fiscally sustainable? Is it providing equal access to all citizens? Is it addressing
government failures, or are there unforeseen negative externalities? Is it addressing market
failures, and is the market healthy and stable? Finally, does the program seem feasible to keep, or
is further reform needed? These questions should provide a starting evaluation criterion for
identifying whether the Equal Healthcare Act is living up to its promise of affordable healthcare
for all citizens.

Appendix A
Current Policy
Fiscal
Sustainability

Equal Access

Addressing
Government
Failures

Addressing
Market
Failures

Political
Feasibility

American
Healthcare Act
The AHCA was
predicted to
reduce the overall
costs by $300
billion which
would finance
current outlays
without adding to
the deficit.
Moderate

Medicare for All

Equal Healthcare Act

Moderate

Affordable Care
Act
The ACA costed
$300 billion in
the past 10 years.
Further
expansion and
removal of
certain provisions
have altered
projected costs.
Moderate

As even
conservative
estimates range the
costs into the
trillion of dollars,
this plan is fiscally
unsustainable
without significant
tax reform.
Low

As the EHA is tied
directly to FICA payroll
taxes, the vouchers
program is inherently
fiscally sustainable
while making the
Federal Reserve
responsible for
administration.
High

Medicare and
Medicaid
provide
insurance for the
elderly and poor
respectively, but
it leaves all
other citizens to
obtain private
insurance
themselves.
Low

The ACA
maintains the
current structure
of Medicaid but
expands
Medicare access
to a larger pool of
citizens and could
reduce the
uninsured to 25.6
million.
Moderate

Subsidizing
access to
healthcare for
taxpaying
citizens via HSAs
increases access
but only to those
able to afford
HSA
investments.

The EHA provides
equal access to private,
nonprofit insurance via
vouchers to all US
citizens. Backlogging
the vouchers into
Federal Reserve
secured HSAs insures
funds for immediate
and future access.

Low

Though it would
provide equal
access to
government run
insurance for all
citizens, future
reductions in
benefits, to
increase
sustainability,
jeopardize access.
High

Medicare and
Medicaid do not
address moral
hazard well
enough to avoid
free riders or
incentive selfinsurance.
Low

The Affordable
Care Act failed to
address moral
hazard but
required free
riders to purchase
insurance.

The AHCA
maintains the
current policy
structure and
does not include
provisions to
prevent free
riders.
Low

Creating a publicly
run universal
insurance benefits
from economies of
scale, but concerns
over unsustainable
expenditure
remain.
Moderate

A universal but limited
voucher program
prevents overuse or
underuse of healthcare.
Selective programs are
also prevented from
allowing any group to
free ride.
High

Currently, there
are no controls
on the profit
incentive other
than a premium
cap of three
times the lowest
premium.

Promotes
personal saving
for future medical
outlays via HSAs
and retains many
restrictions on
businesses found
in ACA.

Creates a publicly
run insurance pool
that would largely
outcompete private
insurances thereby
removing the
profit incentive.

By capping
administrative costs,
encouraging
competition across state
lines, and reforming
private insurers into
nonprofits, the profit
incentive is realigned to
serve the consumer.

Low

Created the
premium cap on
private insurers
and created a
mandate since
repealed that
required
companies to
insure full time
employees.
Moderate

Moderate

High

High

Given the
inherent inertia
of the
legislature, the
current policy is
most likely to
continue with
small revisions.
High

Given that the
bill has passed
before, it is
feasible that the
individual and
employer
mandates could
return.
Moderate

Proved infeasible
to even those
within the
Republican Party;
as it was, it did
not address core
issues in either
market.
Low

Highly
controversial to
Republicans who
believe eliminating
private insurance
is a large
governmental
overreach.
Low

The EHA assuages
Democratic concerns
over private insurance
profiteering and
assuages Republican
concerns over fiscal
irresponsibility.

Currently,
Medicare and
Medicaid
overrun payroll
tax revenue and
require deficit
spending to
sustain.

Low

High

Moderate
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